the question of ‘how are synthetic a priori judgments possible’ in contemporary islamic philosophy

According to kant, the lack of progress in metaphysics is due to the fact that philosophers tried to solve metaphysical problems without examining the limits of our reason, and the outcome of these endeavors has been a dogmatic metaphysics fraught with contradictions and tensions. then, after examining the types of cognition, he concludes that in order to determine the limits of reason’s capacity, one must answer the question: “how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” some contemporary islamic philosophers have sought to answer this question inspired by the teachings of islamic philosophy. one solution involves resorting to conceptual relations that make the synthetic a priori judgments possible, while another solution is to deny outright the a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions of cognition. in this paper, using a comparative-analytical method, i demonstrate that these two solutions are unsuccessful. the proposed alternative is to consider the possibility of such propositions as fundamental and in no need of further explanation. this suggestion seems to be simpler and fully consistent with the teachings of islamic philosophy.

the question of ‘how are synthetic a priori judgments possible’ in contemporary islamic philosophy

according to kant, the lack of progress in metaphysics is due to the fact that philosophers tried to solve metaphysical problems without examining the limits of our reason, and the outcome of these endeavors has been a dogmatic metaphysics fraught with contradictions and tensions. then, after examining the types of cognition, he concludes that in order to determine the limits of reason’s capacity, one must answer the question: “how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” some contemporary islamic philosophers have sought to answer this question inspired by the teachings of islamic philosophy. one solution involves resorting to conceptual relations that make the synthetic a priori judgments possible, while another solution is to deny outright the a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions of cognition. in this paper, using a comparative-analytical method, i demonstrate that these two solutions are unsuccessful. the proposed alternative is to consider the possibility of such propositions as fundamental and in no need of further explanation. this suggestion seems to be simpler and fully consistent with the teachings of islamic philosophy.