haji and the indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will

In recent work, i defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (lemos, 2018, ch. 5; 2021; 2023, ch. 6). on this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. in basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. in a recent article, ishtiyaque haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. i argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.

haji and the indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will

in recent work, i defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (lemos, 2018, ch. 5; 2021; 2023, ch. 6). on this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. in basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. in a recent article, ishtiyaque haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. i argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.