free will versus determinism - as determined by radical conceptual changes

My objective in this article is to question whether the problem of free will can, within our current conceptual system, be framed coherently. it is already widely recognized that a mental faculty, the will, needed to initiate action, no longer fits with current thought. however, we can still ask whether human decisions and actions are determined by something other than the agent. so the important question is whether we still have a cogent concept of determinism. the two prevalent alternatives are a closed set of deterministic laws of nature, and a simple distillation of the principle of sufficient reason: all events must have a cause. i first provide examples showing that philosophical concepts come and go as categorial frameworks change. the modern concept of deterministic laws of nature was developed during the latter half of the modern period and is now being called seriously into question. g. w. leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason could only be justified in theological terms, which most contemporary western scholars reject. i end with an inadequate account of a dawning worldview based on complex adaptive systems theory, in which most human actions are best described in terms of nonnecessitating propensities.

Free Will versus Determinism - As Determined by Radical Conceptual Changes

My objective in this article is to question whether the problem of free will can, within our current conceptual system, be framed coherently. It is already widely recognized that a mental faculty, the will, needed to initiate action, no longer fits with current thought. However, we can still ask whether human decisions and actions are determined by something other than the agent. So the important question is whether we still have a cogent concept of determinism. The two prevalent alternatives are a closed set of deterministic laws of nature, and a simple distillation of the principle of sufficient reason: all events must have a cause. I first provide examples showing that philosophical concepts come and go as categorial frameworks change. The modern concept of deterministic laws of nature was developed during the latter half of the modern period and is now being called seriously into question. G. W. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason could only be justified in theological terms, which most contemporary Western scholars reject. I end with an inadequate account of a dawning worldview based on complex adaptive systems theory, in which most human actions are best described in terms of nonnecessitating propensities.