تحلیل و بررسی نظریهٔ فخر رازی و خواجه نصیرالدین طوسی دربارۀ تصوّر و تصدیق

تقسیم علم به «تصور» و «تصدیق» از مباحث بنیادی است، اما دو اِشکال به تعریف آن مطرح است، یکی «عدم رعایت ملاکات تقسیم منطقی» که دو مصداق دارد؛ دیگری «تقابل دو مقوله در یک ماهیت». برخی اندیشمندان، اِشکال اول را با لحاظ اعتبارات مختلف در تقسیم، پاسخ گفته‌اند و در پاسخ به اشکال دوم نیز گفته‌اند: حکم، لازم تصدیق است و به منزلهٔ فصل است و معیّت تصوّر و حکم، ذهنی است. فخر رازی، «تصدیق» را مرکّب می‌داند که از اشکالات آنْ اکتساب تصدیق از قول شارح یا هم از قول شارح و هم از حجّت، و همچنین ناسازگاری آن با وحدت و بساطت علم است. از آنجا که راه‌حل‌ها و تلاش اندیشمندان برای رهایی از اشکالات نظریهٔ تصوّر و تصدیق، ثمری ندارد، استفاده فخر رازی از آنها بی‌فایده است. افزون بر این، چون مبنای ترکیب تصدیق اِشکال دارد، جواب‌ها و لوازم مبتنی بر آن نیز اِشکال دارد. بنابراین، فخر رازی در پاسخ به اشکالات موفق به نظر نمی‌رسد. خواجه نصیرالدین طوسی، «معنا» را مَقسم تصوّر و تصدیق می‌داند. علم، تنها تصوّر است و تصدیق همان حکم است که فعل نفس است. تصوّر این فعل توسط نفس سبب می‌شود از مصادیق تصور‌گردد. انحصار علم در تصورات، منجر به انکار بخش حجّت از منطق می‌شود و با اصول تقسیم منطقی نیز منافات دارد. بر این اساس، تقسیم علم به اقسام دوگانه، تقسیمی مَجازی و تسامحی می‌شود. خواجه با معرفی «معنا» به عنوان مقسم، توانست بخش نخست مشکل اول را پاسخ دهد؛ چنان‌که با یکسان دانستن تصدیق با حکم نیز بخش دوم آن و هم اِشکال دوم که بحثی هستی‌شناختی است، اساساً قابل طرح نیست.

An Analysis and Study of Fakhr Razi’s and Khwaja Nasir Tusi’s Theory Regarding Notion and Assertion

The division of knowledge into “notion” and “assertion” is one of the foundational discussions. Knowledge, in its general sense, is divided into knowledgebypresence and acquired knowledge. Acquired is either notional that is not judgment or notional accompanied by judgment. The former is “notion” while the latter is “assertion.” The two problems of this division are as follows: 1) “failure to comply with the criteria of rational division” which includes the instances of “unity of the divider and divided” and “lack of contrast between the types; 2) “the contrast of two categories in one quiddity.” Thinkers have replied to the first problem by considering the different validities in division, that is, the divider is unconditioned, notion is negativity conditioned, and assertion conditioned to something. In response to the second problem, they have said that judgment is necessary to assertion and is tantamount to the differentia, and the companionship of notion and judgment is mental. Apart from asserting the composition of assertion and explaining its parts, Fakhr Razi believes in the logical requisites of composition as well. According to him, assertion is the collection of notions of object and predicate and copula and judgment. Its problem is the acquirement of assertion from definition dues to the selfevidence of judgment; or it is from both definition and argument due to the acquiredness of judgment. As it were, the acceptance of the acquirement of judgment is incompatible with Fakhr Razi’s foundation in considering notions selfevidence. Another problem is the incompatibility with the unity and simplicity of knowledge. In his view, we cannot eliminate the first problem by considering the different validities in the divisions and divider because firstly, the type of these conditions is mentallyposited and they cannot be the differentia for real matters. Secondly, these validations explain the manner of presence of the divider in the divisions and their relationship to each other and is not specific to notion and assertion. Similarly, using judgment as the diffrentia of assertion cannot be a reply to the second problem because no differentia has been mentioned to conceive a part of assertion to make it acquired and distinct. Moreover, because Fakhr Razi’s basis has a problem in the composition of assertion, answers and requisites based on it will also be problematic. Therefore, his view does not appear to be successful in solving the problems. In the explanation of the views of the philosophers, Nasir alDin Tusi considers assertion to be judgment. “Meaning” is the divider of notion and assertion. Notion is really knowledge and assertion is knowledge of it reverts to notion. In reality, assertion is judgment and judgment has two aspects: 1) it is an action of the soul; 2) conceptualization of this action of the soul by the soul. According to the second aspect, judgment is one of the instances of notion. The main point in this view is to consider notion as the basis; however, limiting knowledge to notions results in the denial of the share of argument in the two parts of logic. As it were, the division of knowledge into two parts makes the division figurative and indulgent. However, if one seeks the different in the philosophical and logical aspects in Khwaja Nasir’s view, then from a philosophical perspective, assertion is judgment and reverts to notion and this results in the exclusiveness of knowledge to notions. Therefore, there are essentially no divisions for knowledge. However, the concept of notion and assertion is one of the issues of logic. From this perspective, knowledge is figuratively divided and since it is in the beginning of logic and is in the position of education, such a matter is allowed. Therefore, by defining “meaning” as a divider, Khwaja could answer the first part of the first problem. As it were, considering assertion to be the same as judgment is both its second part and also the second problem which is an existential and ontological discussion would essentially not be applicable.