The Saying/Showing Distinction in Early Wittgenstein and Its Implications

In this paper, i shall try to clarify the saying/showing distinetion and to emphasize the role of this distinction in constructing a coherent picture of language and the world. in order to properly understand the differences between the sayable and the showable, i will throw light on the limits of language and the world. i will explain why it is impossible to say the showable and why it leads to non-sense. i will elucidate the relation between mysticism and the saying/showing distinction and show that both of them are better understood in light of wittgenstein's solipsism. i will explain how wittgenstein'stranscendental solipsism is different from classical solipsism and how the former leads to pure realism. at several points, i will use the kantian framework to explain wittgenstem's view, especially whenjustifying wittgenstein's realism.