norms and explanation of action

It seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; steglichpetersen makes the point as there is no strong relation between normative judgments and motivation from such judgments. to explain why someone does what a norm prescribes, according to steglichpetersen, we need to know not only that they acknowledge the norm, but that they are motivated to follow it. i will argue that this apparent truism is false in the case of constitutive norms. in a constitutive norm, the action specified in the correctness condition is constitutive of what is governed by the norm. i will focus on the constitutive norm of belief to argue that the mere acknowledgment of the norm suffices to explain the transparency of belief. that is to say, i explain why a subject who deliberates whether to believe that p thereby, in virtue of acknowledgment of the belief norm, deliberates whether p.