Heidegger, Ontological Attitude and Naturalism

The dispute between realists and antirealists in the philosophy of sciencehas been a heated one on both sides of the english channel. analyticand continental philosophers alike have been engaged in attempting tosort out the ramifications and implications of scientific practice. campshave been formed, sides demarcated, ink spilled. despite arthur fine’sproclamation, in the 1980s, that “realism is dead,” it seems still to thrive invarious philosophical pockets: its defenders still write, its critics still read.likewise, the antirealist challenge to realism has not conceded an inch.the dispute does indeed seem intractable. this intractability is frustratingto virtually everyone involved. to respond to such an intractability, thereare in general three options. i will discuss these options i will employ thethird option. i will do so using the work of both arthur fine and theearly heidegger. specifically, i will claim that fine’s position is in essencea heideggerian view of ontology. the natural ontological attitude (ornoa) is nothing more than a recognition of the reality of things as theyappear to human beings, concernfully absorbed in the world. to theorizeabout ontology in a way that goes beyond our phenomenology is todo philosophy irresponsibly. it is doing philosophy irresponsibly, i willcontend, that generates a realist/antirealist dispute.