رویکرد انضمامی به قانون اساسی در ایدئالیسم مطلق هگل

رویکرد انضمامی به مفاهیم، از ویژگی‌های اصلی فلسفه هگل است. در دیدگاه هگل مفهوم انضمامی بر افراد خود تقدم دارد و آنچه موضوعیت دارد ایده یا مفهوم تحقق یافته است، در حالی که مفهوم انتزاعی از طریق بازنمایی ذهنی و عملیات انتزاع نسبت به امور محقق شکل می‌گیرد و محتوای خود را به مثابه امری پیشینی می‌گیرد که اساسا ساکن و جامد است. مفهوم قانون اساسی در نظام فکری هگل امری انضمامی است و به‌عنوان اصول اساسی آخرین مرحله از سیر تکامل روح در تاریخ یعنی دولت، متعین می‌گردد. بر اساس نظر هگل هر نوع تعریف انتزاعی و پیشینی از قانون اساسی یک وجهی و خالی از حقیقت است و قانون اساسی را به مثابه یک وجود ناپایدار و تصادفی مطرح می‌کند. بنابراین باید مفهوم قانون اساسی را از متن پدیدارشناسی روح استنتاج نمود. رویکرد انضمامی هگل به مفهوم قانون اساسی از تلقی متعارف در حقوق اساسی فاصله می‌گیرد و آثار مهمی دارد؛ هدف این مقاله اثبات این مطلب است که قانون اساسی به مثابه روح ملت یک امر ساختگی و مصنوع نیست و پرسش از اینکه چه کسی قانون اساسی را تدوین کرده بی‌معنا است و همچنین تحمیل قانون اساسی بر یک ملت مردود است.

a concrete approach to the constitution in hegel’s absolute idealism

introductionconcreteness is one of the most important aspects of hegel’s philosophy. according to hegel, a concept is empty and philosophically insignificant unless it is realized, and only when the concept is fully realized can it be considered an idea. the concept of the constitution, a key element in constitutional law, is typically understood in an abstract manner. however, hegel’s emphasis on the concrete approach offers a powerful framework for freeing this concept from abstraction, determining it based on concrete thought. the abstract view of the constitution has dominated iran’s constitutional laws in the modern era, with contemporary constitutional frameworks being shaped by this abstract perspective. therefore, revisiting the concept of the constitution through the lens of hegel’s absolute idealism provides a suitable foundation for concrete conception of iran’s modern constitutional law. literature reviewthere is no serious research directly addressing the problem of the present study. however, a few studies touch upon the concept of the constitution in hegel’s philosophy. for instance, the article “on the notion of constitution in hegel” (bobbio, 1980) categorized the positive and negative elements of the concept of constitution according to hegel’s thought. yet, the author argues that this categorization of positive and negative elements diverges from the spirit of hegel’s words and his dialectical method, including his concrete approach. in addition, hegel’s ideas on freedom, the state, and the constitution are the main topics in “idealism and the idea of a constitution” (thornhill, 2013). however, thornhill’s research does not focus on hegel’s concrete approach. similarly, in “hegel’s idea of the state,” houlgate (2019) examined the concept of the constitution in the context of hegel’s notion of the state, but he did not address the concreteness of the constitution. additionally, martin loughlin, a foundational thinker in public law, touched on hegel’s approach in fundamentals of public law (loughlin, 2010)) and “in search of the constitution” (loughlin, 2019). while loughlin discusses hegel’s perspective on the constitution, his treatment of the concept differs from the approach taken in the present article.  frederick beiser, a prominent hegel scholar, did not offer a detailed discussion on the constitution in his book hegel (beiser, 2002). while beiser addresses some hegelian concepts (e.g., the state), the concept of constitution is mentioned in passing, without direct attention to hegel’s concrete approach in relation to the constitution. this also holds true of other works published by commentator of hegel. it is thus evident that there is a gap in literature regarding the concept of the constitution from the perspective of public law foundations, particularly with respect to its concreteness and implications in constitutional rights. materials and methodsgrounded in the principles of public law (i.e., fundamental rights), the present study adopted an analytical approach consisting of theoretical and philosophical analysis. more specifically, since the nature and scope of the research topic is rooted in hegel’s methodological approach, as elaborated in the phenomenology of spirit, the analysis sought to adhere to this framework, rather than focusing on the abstract philosophical analysis of the constitution. the approach to understanding the concept of the constitution was thus inferred from the concrete in the context of the evolution of spirit in history. results and discussionthe common approach in constitutional law defines the concept of the constitution in abstract terms, often presenting it as a legal source in document form. this contrasts with hegel’s idealism, which adopts a different perspective on concepts.